NOTE

Investigation Report

Collision between Osprey V and Odete C

Triabunna, Tasmania, 5th February 2018

Investigation reports are endorsed by the Board of Marine and Safety Tasmania (MAST) prior to publication.

At the meeting held on 8 June 2018, the MAST Board agreed to publish the report with the following amendment to Part 7 Recommendation 1.

1. Given the history of malfunctions with the remote control unit and its susceptibility to damage when it is being transferred to and from the outside deck, alternative arrangements for a control unit with suitable weather protection, shall be fitted outside the wheelhouse to prevent future malfunctions.
Investigation into the Collision
between
Osprey V and Odete C
at
Triabunna, Tasmania
On
5th February 2018
FOREWORD

Investigations into maritime incidents occurring within the jurisdiction of Marine and Safety Tasmania (MAST) are conducted in accordance with Part 2 of the *Marine and Safety (Maritime Incidents) Regulations 2017*.

Investigation reports are endorsed by the Board of MAST prior to publication. It is MAST policy to publish investigation reports to increase awareness of maritime incidents and improve safety at sea.

Copies of this report can be obtained from:

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1. Executive Summary

On 5th February 2018 the passenger ferry Osprey V returned from a trip to Maria Island and berthed at the Glamorgan Spring Bay Council pontoon in Triabunna that has been allocated to the vessel for the daily service to Maria Island. The vessel was securely moored alongside the pontoon and an exchange of passengers was completed prior to the vessels advertised departure time of 12.00 pm on the same day. At noon the Master manoeuvered the vessel slightly astern, using the remote control, outside on the starboard side of the wheelhouse, to clear the forward mooring line. When the line was clear the Master placed the remote control unit inside the wheelhouse, prior to entering the wheelhouse, with the intention of using the main controls to manoeuver the vessel off the berth in preparation for the trip down the Triabunna Channel. As the Master entered the wheelhouse the port engine engaged and the Osprey V moved ahead and to starboard towards the FV Odete C which was moored starboard side too alongside the main wharf just south of the ferry’s pontoon. The Master attempted to disengage the port engine on the main controls and also on the remote unit however the port engine continued to run ahead until the Osprey V made contact with the stern of the Odete C. When the Osprey V collided with the Odete C the master engaged both main engines astern and the Osprey V moved clear of the Odete C. Once the master established that there were no injuries to personnel on the Odete C or to passengers and crew on the Osprey V, the vessel moved astern and momentarily berthed alongside the ferry pontoon, prior to heading down the channel to Maria Island.

2. Sources of Information

An incident report was submitted to Marine and Safety Tasmania (MAST), by the master of the Osprey V, on 7th February 2018. An incident report on the Australian Maritime Safety Authority form 529 was made by the owner of the FV Odete C on 5th February 2018. An additional detailed written report, with statements from personnel onboard the Odete C at the time of the incident, was made to MAST by the owners of the Odete C on 5th February 2018. Coverage of the incident was captured on one of the Glamorgan Spring Bay Council’s CCTV cameras located just to the north of the ferry pontoon.

The following interviews were conducted on 15th March 2018
1. Master of the Osprey V at the time of the incident.
2. The electrical contractor working on the Odete C at the time of the incident.
3. The owner of the Odete C.
The owner of the Osprey was interviewed on 8th March 2018

3. Vessel and Crew Details

Osprey V

- Owner: Secheron Holdings Pty Ltd
- Dimensions:
  - Length: 29.56 m
  - Beam: 6.29 m
  - Depth: 2.065 m
- Year Built: 1994
- Registration Number: 24030QC
- Port of Registry: Hobart
- Survey Class: 1D
- Propulsion: 2 x 1,000 horsepower engines + bow thruster.
- AMSA Certificate of Survey is shown in Attachment 1

Crew Qualifications
The vessel’s Master holds a current Master 4 certificate

4. Sequence of Events

Based on CCTV footage, it was possible to accurately re-constructed the incident and identify the sequence of events leading up to the collision. The video runs for 2 minutes 45 seconds and commences at 12:11:57 local time. The time shown on the camera may not be completely accurate however, for the purposes of this investigation, it’s the video presentation rather than the timing that’s of importance.
The following salient points of the incident have been put together using actual footage with supporting comment to assist with understanding the sequence of events leading up to the collision.

1. 12.12.08 - Crew are on stand-by to let go and the Master is outside, on the starboard side of the wheelhouse.

2. 12.12.25 - Master uses remote control to “kick” the vessel astern to allow the bow mooring line to be cleared.
3. 12.12.30 - Master places remote control unit through window into wheelhouse. Vessel starting to move slowly astern with the stern lifting off the pontoon pile.

4. 12.12.42 - Master acknowledges that the forward mooring line has been cleared and secured to pontoon pile.
5. 12.12.43 Port engine engages ahead.

Note, there is no wash from the bow thruster and the Master is still entering the wheelhouse through the starboard door.
6. **12.12.51** - Vessel moving ahead with port engine engaged. Vessels bow swinging to starboard and heading towards Odete C.

7. **12.12.56** - Osprey V collides with the Odete C.

   Note, port engine still engaged ahead.
8. 12.13.00 - Osprey V rebounds from the Odete C.

Note, the port engine is now disengaged.

9. 12.13.03 - Osprey V moving astern, away from the Odete C.

Note, port engine appears to be engaged astern.
10. 12.13.27 - Vessel manoeuvered ahead to stop astern movement and preparing to berth alongside pontoon.

12. 12.14.22 - Vessel makes normal departure

5. Comments

a. Following the clearing of the headline, and as the Master starts to enter the wheelhouse, the port engine engages ahead. The thruster is not in operation as would be the case on a normal departure.

b. There were no personnel on the foredeck of the Osprey V at the time of the collision. There were several contractors working on the afterdeck of the Odete C.

c. The Master spoke to personnel on the Odete C to ensure nobody had been hurt and asked if any damage had been done to the bow of the Osprey. The Master was advised that the vessel had a dent in the bow.

d. When the collision occurred, the Osprey V pushed the Odete C forward on its mooring lines. As the force of the Osprey V was reduced the Odete C moved astern and made further light contact with the Osprey.

e. The Odete C sustained damage to the after bulwark and an aluminium stern guardrail.
f. The Osprey V has a high power to weight ratio which produces very good maneuverability. With both main engines just clutched-in the vessel has a minimum speed of 6.7 knots. When the port engine was engaged whilst alongside, the vessel quickly moved ahead and within 13 seconds had collided with the Odete C.

g. Bridge equipment, including engine controls had been tested earlier in the day when the vessel was being prepared for trips to Maria Island.

h. Since the vessel had entered service in October 2017, all bridge equipment had functioned normally. Whist there was an intermittent problem with engaging the main engines using the remote control unit it was always used for berthing and unberthing.

i. When the port engine engaged unexpectedly the Master was unable to disengage the remote control unit until after the collision with the Odete C when control was transferred to the main unit in the wheelhouse and both engines placed astern.
Remote Control Unit

- The remote control was not immediately tested following the incident.
- Whilst alongside at Maria Island an attempt was made to operate the port engine using the remote control unit. Flickering of the engine indicator light was observed however the port engine wouldn’t engage.
- It was reported that, following the incident, the remote control was inspected and the wiring found to be crushed where it passes through the gland into the control unit. There also appears to be a bare wire where the cable joins into the plug. *See below photo.*

![Remote Control Unit with wire damage](image)

- It was reported that the remote control unit had previously failed to engage the main engines however this only occurred on an intermittent basis and the controller would eventually function following some manipulation of the control buttons.
- The remote control unit has not been used since the incident.

6. Principal Conclusions

a. The Master had not entered the wheelhouse between placing the remote control unit through the window and the port engine being engaged therefore it can be reasonably assumed that control of the vessels propulsion units had not been transferred to the main control consul in the wheelhouse. Control of propulsion remained with the remote control unit.
b. The Master was still entering the wheelhouse, after confirming the headline was clear, when the port engine engaged. In addition, the thruster had not been activated, as would normally be the case when departing the berth, therefore actual maneuvering of the vessel by the Master would appear not to have commenced.

c. It’s possible the remote control unit was “bumped” whilst it was being placed inside the wheelhouse thereby engaging the port engine. There is an approximate 10 second delay from the time the remote control unit is placed in the wheelhouse to the time the port engine shows sign (wash) of engagement. This assumption is purely speculative and has therefore been disregarded.

d. Given the previously known fault with the remote control unit it would appear that some sort of malfunction occurred that engaged the port engine which was the primary cause of the collision with the Odete C.

e. There is no technical information available to explain why the malfunction of the remote control unit occurred.

f. Whilst there was only minimal damage reported to the Master immediately following the collision, an inspection of the vessel’s bow was not carried out until the vessel berthed at Maria Island.

7. Recommendations

1. Given the history of malfunctions with the remote control unit and its susceptibility to damage when it is being transferred to and from the outside deck, a fixed control unit, with suitable weather protection, should be considered for the starboard side, outside the wheelhouse.

2. The proposed outside control unit should be tested prior to departure from a berth and whilst the vessel is securely moored alongside.

Investigator
Appendix 1 - Osprey V Certificate of Survey
Investigation into Osprey collision with Odete C